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EDITOR'S NOTE
The four articles contained in this issue of DICTA are papers which were
delivered at the 55th Annual Convention of the Colorado Bar Association in
Colorado Springs. The first two papers were presented as part of the One Year
Review of Colorado Law on October 23, 1953. The following two papers were
presented at a meeting of the Water Law Section of the Association on October
21, 1953. Another paper presented (t this meeting of the Water Law Section
irill be published in the Febritary, 1951 issue- of DICTA.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, ATTORNEYS
AND FAMILY LAW
MAURICE REULER, of the Denver Bar
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION CASES

The several cases decided by our Supreme Court this past year
covering workmen's compensation have fallen into various subtopics, and it will be my purpose to subsume the decisions into
these sub-topics in an effort to put them into sharper focus.
Four cases dealt with the kind of accident which might be
covered in a workman's compensation situation. In the first of
these, Industrial Commission v. Corwin,' the decision of the Supreme Court reversed the finding of the trial court which had
previously set aside an Industrial Commission finding. The Industrial Commission had awarded compensation to a nurse who
alleged she had contracted infantile paralysis while working in the
polio ward of the defendant hospitial. It appeared from the facts
that the claimant had been more or less isolated in the ward for
some two months and had had very little outside contact. Furthermore, of the four nurses working in the ward, two, including herself, had become ill of this disease. The hospital sought to escape
responsibility on the ground that the method of transmission of
polio could not be established, therefore, they could not be held
responsible. Our Court determined that this was a compensible
accident arising out of, and in the course of employment. The
phrase "accidently sustained" means simply that the harm is
unexpected. It does not mean that the harm need be extraordinary.
The Court also notes that the Workmen's Compensation Act is
highly remedial and beneficial in purpose, and should be liberally
construed.
The Court also defines fhe phrase "an accident arising out of
employment" and states that this means "When there is apparent
to the rational mind upon the consideration of all the circumstances
a casual connection between the conditions under which the work
is required to be performed and the resulting injury" an accident
may be said to arise out of employment.
The Court, in a very interesting decision, Billings Ditch Company v. Industrial Commission,2 ruled that an employee of a non'
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profit mutual ditch company was not covered under the Workmen's
Compensation Act, but was, instead, exempt as an agricultural
worker. This decision reversed both the Industrial Commission
and the trial court's findings. The rationale of the case appears to
be the theory that if the claimant had been working for an individual farmer and was injured while repairing a ditch there
could be no question as to the exemption. Therefore, where farmers ban together to form a mutual company, the stock of which
is owned by themselves so that the company is merely the agency
of conveyance, employees of such company are not covered.
The question was also raised in this case as to whether the
Supreme Court was not bound by the findings of fact made by
the Industrial Commission and confirmed by the District Court.
In overruling this contention, it was determined in accordance
with the general rule that where, as here, the facts are undisputed,
then the issue becomes one of law, and the Court would not be
bound by the findings of fact.
An employee of a paint company who had been calling on
the trade in the northern part of the State was also a hunter.
During pheasant season he went hunting with two employees of
one of his customers. While hunting he was shot in the eye, and
sought to recover for the loss. The Industrial Commission and the
trial court sustained the position of the claimant to the effect
that he was entertaining customers and had, therefore, suffered
an accident arising out of the course of his employment. The Supreme Court reversed on the ground that such an undertaking
could not be classified as arising out of the course of employment,
particularly so where it was shown that the claimant had not
taken his customer's employees as guests, but they had all, more
or less, gone out and shared expenses. The Court notes that the
only evidence upholding claimant's position was his own statement.
The Court in determining that such evidence was insufficient stated:
"The preponderance of the evidence must show that the claimant
was performing work connected with his job as hereinbefore outlined." The statement of the claimant being the only evidence in
a case such as this is insufficient to establish a preponderance.
Finally, the Court noted that the accident was simply a risk
common to all hunters and could not be said to be a risk connected
with the claimant's job. In a rather strong dissent, two of the Justices took the position "That the refusal of our court to be governed by findings of fact in this case is indicative of what appears to be a diminishing respect for the adjudication of facts
by trial courts and other finding bodies. Thus the majority opinion
does violence to the elemental rule in proceedings on error that
findings of fact are to be accepted by appellate courts in the absence of a clear showing of error." Aetna Casualty Company r.
Industrial Commission. .,
.... Colo ......
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Lastly, in the cases decided this year, concerned with the
kind of coverage under the Workmen's Compensation Act, we
have a precedent making decision, mainly, the University of Denver v. Nemeth.4 Here the claimant was a student at the University
of Denver and was injured during spring football practice. The
facts showed that he received $50.00 per month for taking care
of tennis courts and various other things, but further showed
that he would lose both this and his board and room as well if
he failed to produce on the football team. The Supreme Court
sustained on the following grounds the finding of the trial court
that Nemeth had sustained an injury compensible under our
Workmen's Compensation Act.
(a) That the fact that the University of Denver is an
educational institution does not prevent it from being within
the scope and purview of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
The Court notes that educational institutions today are big
business.
(b) The Court next determines that the claimant, although a part time employee, was still a regular, rather than
a casual, employee and was thus within the terms of the act.
(c) The controlling point in the case is whether or not
"under all of the circumstances the injury arose from something which was incident to the claimant's employment."
Here, says the Court, the claimant had to produce in football or lose his job. While not a direct part of his employment, it was at least incident thereto and therefore arose out
of it. "In the instant case, Nemeth at the time of his injury
was in the employ of the university, was upon his employer's
premises, occupying himself consistently with his contract
of hire in a manner pertaining to or incidental to his employment. * * * The obligation to compensate Nemeth arises
solely because of the nature of the contract, its incidents and
the responsibilities which Nemeth assumed in order to not
only earn his remuneration, but to retain his job. He apparently had the physical ability and aptitude for football, and
the university hired him to perform work on the campus,
and as an incident of this work to have him engage in football."
Parenthetically, it is my opinion that the argument of the
defendant based on public policy, namely, that it is against public policy to require an educational institution to come under workmen's compensation with respect to work scholarships for its
students of whatever kind, should have been sustained as being
sound. There is no doubt that this decision reflects the present
condition existing in college athletics. However, it still seems
novel to me, at least, to render our universities subject to claims
of this sort.
'....
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Three cases cited by our Court were concerned with the problems of evidence. In the first of these, for the first time on appeal
the claimant alleged that both the Industrial Commission and the
District Court had erred when they ignored the undisputed testimony of an expert witness that the claimant had suffered a
psychoneurotic injury. The Court reaffirmed ,the well known rule
that a matter not raised before the Industrial Commission or
the trial court could not be raised for the first time upon appeal.
The Court also points out that in his opinion the evidence of
the expert was not undisputed and that even if it were, it would
not necessarily be conclusive on the fact finding body. Bransall
v. IndustrialCommission.5
The problem of a general finding in a workmen's compensation
case came up in United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Industrial Commission2 Here the Commission found, so far as the accident was concerned ,"that the claimant sustained an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment on July 12, 1951,
and that by reason of such accident he sustained a ruptured intervertebral disc. He left work July 26, 1951, and is temporarily and
totally disabled. His permanent partial disability cannot be determined. His average weekly wages were $59.60." (P. 418). The
Court, in determining that this is an insufficient finding, stated,
in effect, that a general finding on conflicting evidence in a workmen's compensation case where the Court is bound by the findings
of fact of the Commission which are supported by the evidence
that the injury arose out of employment is insufficient to sustain
an award. The proper finding should set out the evidentiary facts,
such as what the claimant was doing, what happened to him,
when the accident happened and the place of the happening. From
these findings the ultimate fact that the accident arose out of and
in the course of the claimant's employment should then be determined. The Court expressly overrules their earlier decisions
which appear to be in conflict with its present ruling.
Next, in dealing with evidential questions, the Court considers a case which arose under the Occupational Disease Act,
Chapter 163, Sessions Laws of 1945. It may be noted that this
is only the second case which has reached our Supreme Court involving this act. Here the claimant alleged that he had contracted
silicosis in the defendant's mine. The evidence indicated that the
only place where claimant was exposed to silicon dioxide was the
employer's mine. The employer sought to deny liability upon the
ground that the act which required that the claimant "establish"
the facts meant that he must prove the facts beyond doubt. The
Court rules that in this, as in other workmen's compensation
and civil cases, the employee must simply prove the facts by a
preponderance of the evidence. The Court also notes, again, that
5...
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it is ordinarily bound by findings of fact upon disputed evidence.
Resurrection Mining Company v. Industrial Commission.7
In a case considering the problem of jurisdiction under the
Workmen's Compensation Act, the Court determined that the
right to appeal from findings of the Commission to District Court
are jurisdictional, cannot be waived and may be raised at any
time. Industrial Commission v. Plains Utility Company.
Finally, the Court, in Pacific Employers v. Industrial Commission,9 ruled that the payment of wages is not ipso facto the
payment of compensation so as to toll the statute of limitations on
the bringing of claims before the Industrial Commission. In this
case, the claimant was injured ofi May 15, 1951. On June 11, 1952,
he filed a claim for compensation. His claim was sustained both
by the Industrial Commission and the District Court upon the
ground that the payment of wages had tolled the six-month statute.
The evidence showed that the employer had made payments after
the injury based on a 40-hour week, although the claimant often
worked 48 or 56 hours. He testified that he thought he was receiving compensation of $21.75, and that his employer was paying
the difference. As the Court points out, this entire evidence was
based on hearsay and was, therefore, incompetent. The Court then
rules "that in order that payment of wages during the absence
of an employee may be held to be the payment of compensation
under the Workmen's Compensation Act it must be established
by competent evidence or reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom that in making these payments the employer was doing so
conscious of the fact that he was making the same as compensation and it must be received by the employee with the knowledge
or reasonable grounds for assuming that the payments made to
him were being made as compensation for his injuries." The evidence in the present case did not meet this test. The Court specifically overrules three prior cases which appeared to hold to
the contrary. The Court, again, also states the rule that where
the evidence is uncontradicted it is not bound by any finding of
fact, and the question becomes one of law for it to determine.
The significant statutory changes under the Workmen's Compensation Act are found in Senate Bill 69, which increased the
benefits payable in case of injury or death in the various categories from 50% to 662/1% of the employee's average weekly
wages, not to exceed maximum payments of $29.75 per week, and
a minimum of $10.00 per week. The act has also been amended to
include as an employee of an insured any working partner or individual employer actively engaged in the operation of the business, provided he takes certain steps to become covered. The
Occupational Disease Act has also been amended to bring its
benefits in line with the Workmen's Compensation Act.
- Colo .....
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Attorneys
Under this topic there have been several cases covering different problems in the field. A most significant case arose under
the question of unauthorized practice, and I think we should congratulate our Association for their vigorous efforts along these
lines.
The holding to which I just referred is commonly called the
"pure trust" case, People v. Schmidt.'0 Here the defendant attempted to sell, through contacts and advertising, a legal panacea
which he designated as a pure trust organization. The home office
of this organization was Chicago. The pure trust was created,
according to defendant's literature and statements, through the
signing of a pure trust indenture contract under which the trustor
conveyed his assets to the pure trust for a given period of time
and received in return so-called professional certificates giving
the holder the right to receive profits from the trust, if there
should be any, and the corpus of the trust at the termination date
of the contract creating same. Management was solely in the
trustees, and the trustor has no rights other than those outlined.
This scheme, according to its propaganda, would protect, for
example, a partner from almost any kind of liability or would
enable a person to avoid most estate problems, including tax questions, but would still permit the trustor, if he were setting up an
estate plan, to control the property from beyond the grave. As
a clincher, it was asserted that this organization was a "United
States constitutional procedure," and as foolproof as any organization could be. Mr. Justice Burke, as referee to determine whether
or not this gentleman and his organization were practicing law
without a license in violation of Section 21, Chapter 14, Vol. 2,
1935 Colorado Statutes Annotated, pointed out that:
The thing that stands out like a mountain peak in
all this accumulated mass of evidence is that businessmen are not lured into disposing of all control of their
property, of embarking into unheard of schemes to escape personal liability, taxes, court costs, attorney fees,
etc., until they are assured by some reputed expert that
the whole novel plan has been time tested and found
legally water tight. It cannot be doubted that the inducement for the so-called purposes of this service was legal
advice, nothing else, and it makes no difference whether
the Chicago concern was legitimate or otherwise, or
whether its representations were true or false. It was
practicing law in Colorado without authority and defendant was re-enforcing its claims and making representations on his own behalf and his own authority was doing
the same thing both in direct violation of our statutes
and in defiance and contempt of this court.
..... Colo. ..... 251 P. 2d 915, 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 9.
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Our Court sustained the finding of the referee and fined the
defendant $500.00, or, in lieu thereof, that he be incarcerated for
90 days in the County Jail of Denver.
The next case which considered the question of unauthorized
practice concerned a public stenographer who advertised in the
telephone directory inter alia "Legal Forms-Depositions, Conveyance Papers." She admitted that she had examined at least one
title and had also prepared a Will. Her sole defense was that she
had no intent to violate the law. The Supreme Court found her
guilty of contempt and engaging in unauthorized practice and
fined her $250.00 or 60 days in jail. People v. Hanna.1
Our Court had next had before it a problem which has been
the bane of many an advocate, namely, how to conduct yourself
in the rare case in which the opposition appears without benefit
of counsel.
In the first of these, Knapp v. Fleming, et al.,'5 the plaintiff
in error, Knapp, appeared pro se in the trial court. Judgment
of dismissal was entered against him and he came by writ of
error to our highest bench. There the Court noted that the writ
must be dismissed for failure to comply with the rules. The Court
stated that while a litigant is permitted to present his own case,
still he should be restricted to the same rules of evidence and
procedure as an attorney; otherwise, ignorance is unjustly rewarded.
Again, in Viles v. Scofield,15 the Court enunciates the principle that "if a litigant for whatever reason sees fit to rely upon
his own understanding of legal principles and the procedures involved in the courts, he must be prepared to accept the consequences of mistakes and errors. One who attempts a major operation without expert knowledge of the precautions essential to
safety cannot be heard to complain if tragedy results."
Finally, there are three decisions directly involving the discipline of attorneys themselves. In the first of these, the Court
points out that it is the duty of the lawyer as an officer of the
court to be absolutely accurate in his statement of facts presented
in his brief in order that the Supreme Court may rely upon them.
Clemann v. Bandimere."4
Again, in Spillane v. Wright," the Court denied a petition
for rehearing, and severely rebuked the attorneys involved. The
Court states: "Silence is sometimes the severest criticism. However, if we remained silent by simply entering an order denying
the petition there would be no indication of our intolerance of a
too prevalent tendency to file argumentative petitions and it
would appear that we condone unfair and unethical practices. As
Colo ......
258 P. 2d 492, 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 22.
--Colo......
258 P. 2d 489, 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 20.
......
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a further indication of unfamiliarity with or disregard for our
rule this petition (for rehearing) seeks an oral argument which
is specifically prohibited."
Lastly, a most recent case is that of People v. Marshall.16
Here the respondent had been a practicing lawyer of many years
standing in Alamosa. He was disbarred for conduct "highly reprehensible and grossly unprofessional and which has brought reproach upon the honored legal profession to which he belongs."
It was noted by the Court that the respondent had previously
been reprimanded for his conduct, but had appeared apparently
to disregard the reprimands. Judge Steele served as referee, and
his findings were adopted by the Court. The specific grounds
which the Judge found to be cause for disbarment were:
(a) Accepting a retainer but failing to perfect a Supreme Court Appeal in a criminal case for which the retainer had been accepted.
(b) Respondent apparently had converted some thousand
dollars of his client's money to his own use.
(c) That the respondent had failed to return papers or
to institute suits on notes which a client had sought to have
him do.
It should also be noted that our Courts in a most important
step, adopted the Canons of Professional and Judicial Ethics with
slight changes in the latter. These are published in September
1953 issue of Dicta.
Family Law
The last topic to which I have been assigned is that of family
law. Again, there may be found under this broad heading several
sub-heads, the cases under each of which will be briefly discussed.
In the first of these, under the general heading of dependency,
we have Everett v. Barry. 17 Here a petition in dependency was
filed on behalf of a maternal grandmother by an attorney who for
filing such was severely rebuked in the following language: "A
petition in dependency must be filed not in behalf of any individual
but only in behalf of the state for the purpose of protecting a
minor child. Such petition should not be filed by any petitioner,
and particularly not by an attorney at law who is an officer of
the court except singly for the protection of a child. It should be
filed only upon credible information and belief that the child is
so circumstanced that for its own protection and well being it
should be taken from existing custody and become a ward of the
state. One assuming to sign such a petition equally assumes the
obligation to present evidence sustaining it and one should not
verify any allegation of such petition as true of his own knowledge
unless the facts set forth therein are within her personal knowl-.-Colo.., 261 P. 2d 719, 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 1.
-- Colo .... , 252 P. 2d 826, 3952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 11.
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edge." (P. 152, 153). The facts showed that the father, a master
sergeant, had always provided a good home for the children and
had always supported them. The children had moved to Denver
with their mother due to her mental condition. This removal had
been instigated by the defendant husband in the hope that she
would be cured. She did improve and her parents sought the custody of the children. In reversing the lower court which had refused to sustain a motion to dismiss, the Supreme Court set out
the rules to govern the actions of Juvenile Courts in dependency
and custody matters. These seven rules are as follows:
1. That the juvenile court is a statutory court with no
jurisdiction beyond that expressly given by statute;
2. That the jurisdiction so given does not include jurisdiction of contests over custody of children in behalf of, or
between, individuals, whether parents, or otherwise;
3. That such jurisdiction attaches only in proceedings
brought, not in behalf of any person, but solely where children
are found delinquent or have been so circumstanced, neglected or imposed upon as to require the state to take over
their custody or act otherwise for their protection;
4. That in a dependency proceeding, such as that befor us, the question to be resolved is not the comparative
rights of different claimants of custody, but solely that of
whether or not the existing custody and surroundings of the
child are such that it is the duty of the state, as parpns
patriae, to take over its custody and make it a ward of the
state;
5. That a dispute between parents or between a parent
and any other person as to right of custody is not such a
controversy as to justify an adjudication of dependency;
6. That a parent, if a fit and suitable person, has the
prior right of custody of his children over a grandparent or
any other person or the state;
7. That a parent is presumed to be a fit and suitable
person to have the custody of his children, and that such
presumption can be overcome only by convincing evidence
to the contrary.
The next case concerning dependency problems is found in
Avery v. The County Court.1 8 Here the Supreme Court sustained
a writ of prohibition in a dependency hearing. The petitioner was
a non-resident of Gilpin County. The defendant mother at the
time the petition was filed raised the question of jurisdiction,
but upon being overruled went to trial. She had been awarded
custody of the child in a Boulder divorce. The Court sets out,
again, the rule that the question of jurisdiction may be raised
at any time. The defect here raised was that the action in dependency was not "filed by any officer of the State Board of Child
11__.Colo ......
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and Animal Protection (an ingenious grouping) or the Juvenile
Court or any person who is a resident of the county having knowledge that the children involved were dependent or neglected"
(p. 58), as provided in Section 3, Chapter 33, 1935 Colorado
Statutes Annotated. The Court rules that where "a statute makes
the residence of a petitioner within a particular county a condition upon which the jurisdiction of a court can be invoked, a
county court is wholly without power or authority to proceed in
a statutory action unless the petitioner is a resident in a county
in which an action is brought."
The Court overrules Hudson v. Mattingley, 69 Colo. 528, 195
Pac. 113 (1921), which had appeared to reach a contrary result
on this question, and states: "Where a statute specifically identifies the officer or persons who may invoke the jurisdiction of a
court in a proceeding which is purely statutory, it is necessary
and essential that the persons thus named shall institute the
proceedings. The identification by the statute of those authorized
to invoke the courts' jurisdiction operates to exclude all persons
not mentioned."
9
In the case of Cederquist v. Archuleta,"
the Court rules that
the Juvenile Court, whose correct title is Juvenile Court in and
for the City and County of Denver and State of Colorado, may
allow support money and medical expenses in a proper paternity
or dependency case, provided that there is evidence as to the
earning capacity of the father and as to the needs of the dependent child, but may not award attorney fees. The Court in reaching
its result calls attention, specifically, to Section 5, Chapter 33,
1935 Colorado Statutes Annotated, which provides that at hearings such as these it is the duty of the county or district attorney,
when requested by the Court or the petitioner to appear on her
behalf and present her case. Therefore, if petitioner seeks other
counsel she must pay for it. Also, in this case, the Court again
affirms that Section 1, Chapter 33, 1935 Colorado Statutes Annotated, requiring a father to support an unborn child and its
mother is constitutional.
0
In the case of Campbell v. Gilliam,"
the trial court had
granted a summary judgment in a dependency proceeding upon
the ground, apparently, that the petitioner did not meet the requirements of the dependency statute with respect to residence.
The facts showed that the petitioner, a neighbor of the defendant at Kalispell, Montana, had become enamored of him, and
that they had had intercourse. Shortly thereafter, she discovered
that she was pregnant, and came to Denver where defendant
was located as a soldier at Lowry Field. He ignored her and she
filed this petition. The trial court, in sustaining the motion for
summary judgment, had also ruled that there was no showing
that the child was dependent or neglected. Our Supreme Court,
.... Colo -..... 253 P. 2d 431, 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. ]I.
.%... Colo ...... 257 P. 2d 965, 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 21.
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in construing Section 13, Chapter 33, 1935 Colorado Statutes
Annotated, states that the primary purpose of the entire statute
is to provide for the welfare of the child, and that the residential
requirements should be liberally construed so as not to defeat this
purpose. The Court further states that the words of the statute
"for the purpose of this section and other sections codified from
the Act of 1907, the words dependent child or neglected child
shall mean any child under the age of 18 years who is dependent
upon the public for support or who is destitute, homeless or
abandoned or who has not proper parental care or guardianship
or who, in the opinion of the court, is entitled to support or care
by its parent or parents where it appears that the parent or
parents are failing or refusing to support or care for said child,"
indicate that the Court shall have jurisdiction where it appears
that the parent or parents are failing to support the child, and
that, therefore, the granting of the motion for summary judgment was error.
There has been but one case in the past year construing the
sections of our statute concerned with annulments. This case is
an exceedingly important one to the Colorado lawyer in its determination of the question of our Court's jurisdiction and the
kind of action which an annulment is. Owen v. Owen."'
In this case, the plaintiff, as conservatrix, sought to have a
marriage annulled which had been entered into by her ward in
the State of Texas some three years prior to the present adjudication. Personal service was made on the defendant, a Texas resident, in Texas. Defendant, by what he termed a special appearance, moved to quash the service in substance on the ground
that this was not an action in which personal service could be
had on a non-resident. Further, the motion was coupled with a
statement that without waiving it, the defendant moved to dismiss for the reason that the Court had no jurisdiction of the
subject matter of the complaint. Both motions were denied in
the County Court. From there the case was appealed to the District Court, which sustained the motions and from there the case
came to the Supreme Court. Our Supreme Court determined two
questions of prime significance in this State:
That an annulment is not an action in rem but in
personam. In the case of divorce the marriage status
is the thing or res upon which the court may act. In an
action for annulment on the ground the marriage ceremony was void, the very allegations of the petition preclude the existence of the thing or res.
We appreciate the difference between actions for divorce and annulment. The former being based on a valid
marriage and a cause of divorce arising post nuptially
while the latter presupposes and is based entirely upon
Colo
1.........
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the assumption that by reason of some legal impediment
the parties were incapable of contracting a valid marriage. In other words, in the latter case because of the
legal impediment the attempted marriage is void ab
initio.
The Court having disposed of the question as to the kind
of action thereby sustaining, in effect, the motion to quash on that
point, then rules that the courts of Colorado have jurisdiction
to determine the validitiy of any marriage performed outside
its borders so long as one of the parties is a domiciliary of Colorado, and states the well known rule that the validity of the
marriage is a question to be determined according to the law
of the State in which the marriage was performed. The Court
specifically points out that it will not pass on the question as
to whether defendant waived the validity of his motion to quash
on that point, then rules that the Courts of Colorado have jurisdiction to determine the validity of any marriage performed outside its borders so long as one of the parties is a domiciliary of
Colorado, and states the well known rule that the validity of the
marriage is a question to be determined according to the law
of the State in which the marriage was performed. Finally, the
Court specifically points out that it will not pass on the question
as to whether defendant waived the validity of his motion to
quash and entered a general appearance when he filed a motion
to dismiss along with it.
Next, we have had several cases concerning divorce. Kleiger
v. Kleiger reaffirms the general proposition that the question of
alimony and the propriety of a property settlement is generally
within the discretion of the trial court, and that where the petitioning wife knew the facts, she could not later attempt to
upset a property and alimony division. It is my thought that this
decision illustrates that the rule in the Bartges case fortunately
cannot be applied to every divorce settlement. U. S. National Bank
V. Bartges, 120 Colo. 317, 220 P. 2d, 600; 122 Colo. 546, 224 P.
2nd, 658.
Perhaps the most significant single case decided in the field
of divorce within the past year is that of Burke v. Burke.2" In 1925
the plaintiff was awarded a divcrce from the defendant and was
given $30.00 per month for support of her minor child. The defendant, for a time, complied with the Court order as to support,
but later moved to another state and failed to make any further
payments. In 1951, the wife applied to the Court to reduce the
child support arrearages to judgment. This was done without
notice to the defendant, the Court entering judgment for the arrearage plus simple interest. The husband then entered his appearance and moved to vacate, which motion, after full hearing, was denied. In sustaining the position of the trial court, our
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Supreme Court holds that under Section 18, Chapter 56, 1935
Colorado Statutes Annotated, execution, property division or imprisonment are proper remedies to enforce child support payments. The Court also notes that these remedies are cumulative
rather than mutally exclusive and states: "Each installment which
matures under a decree which has not been modified becomes a
judgment debt similar to any other judgment for money." (P. 249).
Thus, the Court states that each amount as it becomes due is a
separate judgment debt, and that a consolidated judgment for
arrearage is proper as is the award of simple interest. The Court
also rules that the fact that marriage is a civil contract does not
bring this action within the statute of limitations respecting debts
arising from contracts, and finally states that at least in this case
it was in error to fail to give notice.
In another important decision, People v. The District Court,2
the Court rules that an interlocutory decree, although containing
a statement that plaintiff and defendant were bona fide residents
of Colorado for more than one year last preceding the institution
of the cause of action, as well as being bona fide residents of
Rio Grande County for the same year, and although the complaint contained the same allegation, that these were insufficient
to sustain an interlocutory decree of divorce entered where the
undisputed testimony given subsequent to such entry showed
that neither plaintiff nor defendant were residents of Rio Grande
County but were, in fact, residents of Denver County, and that
defendant had simply been served in transit to Denver. The Court
states that all orders entered in this cause are void because, pursuant to Chapter 56, Section 6, 1935 Colorado Statutes Annotated,
divorce actions can only be brought in the county where the
plaintiff resides or where the defendant resides or where the defendant last resided, unless such can be shown the Court had no
jurisdiction and can enter no orders. Under this ruling perhaps
a court would not have jurisdiction to grant a change of venue
in such a case. Counsel caught in this predicament should possibly seek prohibition.
Several miscellaneous cases have come up under the general
topic of family law, and I am only briefly going to mention them,
since they are not too important.
The first is Thuet v. Thuet,2 4 which holds inter alia that a
wife may convey her land without her husband's knowledge or
consent and that such conveyance, if meeting the other requirements of conveyancing, are proper.
In Franzen v. Zimmerman,2 the plaintiff, a widow, sought
to recover for loss of consortium when her husband was injured
in an auto accident from which injuries he subsequently died. The
Colo ......
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Court states that at common law the wife could not maintain such
action, but it is urged that married women statutes permit such.
The Court indicates that this type action may be maintained where
there is an interference with such rights resulting from intentional
malicious or direct act by another, but that no such action can
be maintained for indirect, remote or consequential loss.
Finally, the Court says that while the present case might
present some difficulty, it is governed by Giggey v. GallagherTransportation Company,26 which denied the right to recover for loss
of consortium based on the negligent actions of a third person.
In closing it may be noted that the statutory enactments covering family law do not appear to be important.
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VAN CISE ON RULE ELEVEN
This Rule of Civil Procedure is the same both in United States
and Colorado Courts. It is very frequently disobeyed by lawyers
and the Courts should begin to enforce the penalties for such action.
The pertinent portions are:
Every pleading of a party represented by an attorney
shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his
individual name, whose address and that of the party shall
be stated. * * * The signature of an attorney constitutes
a certificate by him that he has read the pleading; that to
the best of his knowledge, information and belief there is
good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed
for delay. * * * For a wilful violation of this rule an
attorney may be subjected to appropriate disciplinary
action.
One of the most flagrant violations by attorneys is entering
Counsel's appearance by a false Motion to Dismiss "for the reason that the Complaint fails to state a claim against the defendant
upon which relief can be granted." This is most frequently filed
against a good Complaint in Divorce and very often against good
complaints in other cases. When so filed the attorney so doing
knows that it is ,absolutely untrue.
When the attorneys are trying to work out a settlement of a
case all that counsel should do is to enter his appearance for the
Defendant, then no action can be taken without notice to them.
But to file an untruth is a grave reflection on the lawyer and
should not be allowed by the Court.
PHILIP S. VAN CISE

